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 Introduction: Policy Design Studies Past and Future 
 A roadmap for a new ‘policy design orientation’ exists in studies undertaken in recent years into 
the formulation of complex policy mixes, in ﬁelds such as energy and environmental policy, 
among others ( Howlett and Lejano, 2013 ;  Howlett et al., 2014 ;  Howlett, 2014 a, 2014b). This 
new design orientation focuses attention on the construction of policy packages operating in 
complex multi-policy and multi-level design contexts that are expected to address multiple goals 
and objectives ( del Rio and Howlett, 2013 ). It seeks to better describe the nature of the bundles 
or portfolios of tools that can be used to address policy problems and to help understand the 
interactive effects that occur when multiple tools are used over time ( Howlett et al., 2014 ). 
 The research agenda of the new design orientation is focused on questions that an earlier 
literature on the subject largely neglected, such as the trade-offs existing between different tools 
in complex policy mixes and how to deal with the synergies and conﬂicts that result from tool 
interactions, as well as the different means and patterns—such as layering—through which policy 
mixes evolve over time ( Thelen, 2004 ). 
 This temporal orientation highlights the complex processes through which policies emerge 
over time. It also raises the issues of how to distinguish between design and other formulation 
and decision-making processes and the frequency or likelihood of occurrence of each. Many 
formulation situations, for example, involve information and knowledge limits or involve mul-
tiple actors whose relationships may be more adversarial or competitive than is typically associ-
ated with a ‘design’ process and outcome (‘non-design’) ( Schön, 1988 ;  Gero, 1990 ). That is, not 
all policymaking is logic- or knowledge-driven, and it is debatable how closely policymakers 
approximate the instrumental logic and reasoning that is generally thought to characterize an 
intellectually driven design situation in this ﬁeld or any other ( Howlett et al., 2009 ). 
 This chapter addresses the differences between more and less analytical and instrumental 
policy formulation and decision processes and explores the likelihood of each occurring. By 
engaging in a discussion of the intention to engage in policy design—whether towards public 
interest or more politically driven opportunism—and of the capacity of governments to under-
take such design efforts, the chapter develops a continuum of several formulation processes that 
can exist between ideal instrumental and problem-solution driven policy design and other more 
contingent and less intentional processes. 
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 The Old and New Policy Design Orientation 
 Policy design entails the conscious and deliberate effort to deﬁne policy aims and map them 
instrumentally to policy tools that seek to achieve them (Majone, 1975;  May, 2003 ;  Gilabert and 
Lawford-Smith, 2012 ). In this sense, policy design signiﬁes a particular type of policy formula-
tion that is established on collecting knowledge about the outcomes of policy instrument use on 
policy targets and its relevance to the creation and implementation of policies meant to attain 
speciﬁc policy goals and aspirations ( Weaver, 2009 ,  2010 ;  Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987 ;  Bobrow, 
2006 ;  Montpetit, 2003 ). 
 In policy studies, ‘design’ has been associated with both the analysis of policy instruments them-
selves and their implementation ( May, 2003 ), as well as the effect of policy advice and ideas on the 
process of policy formation ( Linder and Peters, 1990 ). Policy design in this sense can be under-
stood as having a  substantive element that comprises the technical arrangements of alternatives that 
can potentially resolve the policy problem at hand, and a  procedural component that entails all the 
processes and activities necessary to coordinate the activities of policy actors in charge of formulat-
ing, making decisions and administering the alternatives ( Howlett, 2011 ). Policy design, therefore, 
spans both formulation and implementation in the policy process by involving the interactions 
between actors, ideas and interests that ﬂow between both of these stages ( Howlett et al., 2009 ). 
 Howlett, Mukherjee and Woo have argued the recent renewed interest in policy design is differ-
ent in many regards from earlier thinking and reﬂection on the topic ( Howlett et al., 2015 ; see also 
 Howlett and Lejano, 2013 ;  Howlett, 2014 a, 2014b;  Jordan et al., 2013 ). Designs are now treated as 
composed of multiple elements and more complex than was often the case in the past, and more 
attention is being paid to the processes of policy advice and formulation that lead to the adoption 
of certain kinds of designs ( van der Heijden, 2011 ,  Thelen, 2003 ;  Craft and Howlett, 2012 ). 
 Nevertheless, it is often still the case, as has been argued in the past (for example,  Lindblom, 
1959 ;  Dryzek and Ripley, 1988 ;  Linder and Peters, 1990 ), that design thinking in the policy 
sciences is dismissed as an example of excess rationality, one that ignores the garbage-can type 
quality of much policymaking instances ( Cohen et al., 1979 ;  Dryzek, 1983 ;  Kingdon, 1984 ) and 
its overt basis in political and administrative bargaining ( Lindblom, 1959 ). This criticism harkens 
back to the post-WWII criticisms of planning efforts ( Lindblom, 1959 ;  Simon, 1965 ) and the 
reﬂections on the nature of bounded rationality and incrementalism that accompanied it (see 
 Baumgartner and Jones, 1991 ,  2002 ;  Howlett and Migone, 2011 ). This criticism suggests a very 
distinct limit to policy efforts in the design orientation, one in which the usual process of for-
mulation followed is much more a ‘non-design’ one than a ‘design’ one. 
 Although many of these same criticisms remain cogent in the case of some extreme forms of and 
proposals for policy design, here it is argued that this is not a devastating critique of the new policy 
design orientation, unlike the situation in the 1950s and 1960s with planning. This is because in most 
cases contemporary adherents and proponents of policy design are well aware of the limits on cog-
nition and knowledge that plagued earlier planners and made them an easy target for critics. What 
is referred to as ‘policy design’ in the contemporary literature is more subtle and always assumes the 
need to design for context ( Howlett and Mukherjee, 2014 ;  Bobrow, 2006 ;  Howlett, 2011 ). 
 Developing a Spectrum of Design and Non-Design Activities: 
The Signifi cance of Layering and Temporality 
 In itself, this suggests that there is a spectrum of design and non-design formulation processes, 
ranging from capable policy processes informed by instrumental motivations to ‘poor’ politi-
cal ones that are driven by other logics. In order to be more precise about these processes, it is 
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necessary to examine in more detail the nature of the constraints on government intentions, 
which can negatively affect both design and non-design processes. 
 As set out above, one factor that impacts movement along the spectrum is the extent to which 
an existing policy regime is already set in place. That is, almost every design situation is built on 
the legacy of past decisions, and very few policymaking processes begin anew. Instances of com-
pletely new policy portfolios being created are rare, and these are usually cases of unprecedented 
or groundbreaking legislation that has been necessary in response to a new or growing policy 
problems (such as the Clear Air Act enacted in the United States in response to air pollution; 
Schmalensee et al., 1998; Libecap, 2005). In most cases, however, policy initiatives need to be 
enacted in design spaces that contain previous policies. These efforts can thus often be under-
mined due to new policy elements conﬂicting with existing policy components, necessitating 
reform. 1 This can create policy portfolios or mixes that contain various incompatibilities, tending 
to frustrate the achievement of policy goals. 
 That is, the contextual ‘lock in’ that leads to layering can impact the formulation process by 
restricting a government’s ability to evaluate alternatives and plan or design in a purely optimal 
instrumental manner ( Oliphant and Howlett, 2010 ;  Williams, 2012 ). Policy arrangements are often 
the result of transformation pathways that can easily lead to internal contradictions emerging between 
tools and goals within policy mixes ( Hacker, 2004 ), and mixes of policy elements can emerge over 
long stretches of time as a result of successive policy decisions that are not necessarily congruent. 
 Processes of Replacement and Layering and 
Their Implication for Policy Design 
 Like these historical neo-institutionalists, many in the new policy design orientation have argued 
that policy mixes are often the result of transformation pathways—such as layering—that can 
easily lead to internal contradictions between tools and goals within policy mixes (Hacker, 2005). 
 In such situations, policy designers are not faced with the issue of completely re-designing a 
policy ‘package’ but rather with ‘tweaking’ some aspect(s) of it in order to repair its efﬁcacy ( Gun-
ningham and Sinclair, 1999 ;  Thelen, 2003 ,  2004 ;  Eliadis et al., 2005 ). This involves redesigning 
existing regime elements but in the context of a restricted design space that has been altered by 
remnants of earlier policy efforts. 
 In this case, legacies from earlier rounds of decision-making affect the introduction of new ele-
ments that conﬂict with pre-existing policy components. Policy development strongly marked in 
this way is typically one where new elements are added to the policy mix without the removal of 
older ones, and existing elements are stretched to try to ﬁt new goals and changing circumstances. 
 In such circumstances, the introduction of new policy ideas and the resulting interaction 
with existing policy components to foment major policy change are common phenomena, 
much more so than the paradigmatic design overhaul suggested by the idea of the creation of 
an entirely new policy package in order to restore or assert paradigmatic stability. Unlike Hall’s 
original contention, when paradigmatic change does occur, it “may be much less sudden and 
all-encompassing than originally surmised, reﬂecting instead a more gradual, hermeneutic and 
discourse-intensive activity” ( Wilder and Howlett, 2014 ). 
 Customization as a Logic of Policy Design: The Idea of Packaging 
 Most early design studies focused on what in fact is the exceptional case of ‘replacement’ or 
‘exhaustion,’ in which an existing policy is scrapped and a new one adopted in its entirety. 
Although there is this strong tradition in the design literature to restrict discussions of design 
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to situations characterized by processes of replacement and exhaustion, there is ample existing 
evidence showing that many existing policy regimes or mixes have instead developed through 
processes of policy layering, or repeated bouts of policy conversion or policy drift, in which new 
tools and objectives have been piled on top of older ones, creating a mixture of inconsistent and 
incoherent policy elements. Sweeping it all away and starting again with custom made policy 
designs capable of meeting contemporary policy challenges may seem to be the obvious solu-
tion. Policy packaging of this kind, which deliberately seeks to exploit synergistic relationships 
between multiple policy instruments, was deﬁnitely the explicit or implied preference in most 
earlier efforts to promote enhanced policy integration and coherence in designs across differ-
ent policy domains (Meijers, 2004;  Briassoulis, 2005 ). While not all design processes—in fact, 
very few—take place in this fashion, customizing policy responses to complex policy problems 
as a principle indicates a desirable type of formulation and is therefore on the ideal end of the 
design–non-design spectrum. 
 While there cannot be any unambiguously ideal policy instrument portfolios that are pre-
determined ( Flanagan et al., 2011 ), identifying ideal practices of policy design is a worthwhile 
endeavor for policy studies. As Howlett and Rayner (2013) reiterated, policy design is about 
“how speciﬁc types of policy tools or instruments are bundled or combined in a principled 
manner into policy ‘portfolios’ or ‘mixes’ in an effort to attain policy goals” (p. 170). And while 
speciﬁc policy tools and goals evolve over time, ideal design that is customizable to changing 
policy realities is one that aims to uphold coherence and consistency between the means and ends 
of policy. Ideal design also calibrates a policy response in proportion to the policy goals in hand. 
‘Proportionality,’ then, becomes an important feature of customized design given the instances 
where governments systematically devise instruments or instrument mixes representing over- or 
under-reactions, and this disproportionality can tend to move formulation across the design 
spectrum. Understanding the empirics of disproportionate policy design, therefore, represents a 
promising new area of research for depicting different design modalities ( Maor, 2017 ). 
 When this level of customization warrants completely removing old elements and construct-
ing entirely new policy portfolios, the design activity involves replacement ( Kern et al., 2017 ; 
 Kern and Howlett, 2009 ;  Howlett and Rayner, 2007 ). Constructing policy anew in order to 
maintain coherence between policy goals and means and uphold consistency between the mul-
tiple components of the policy instruments that are involved results in bespoke policy mixes 
that are tailored to individual policy contexts. In elaborating on ‘top-down’ versus ‘bottom-up’ 
policy design for regional economic development,  Howells (2005 ) states that “bespoke [bottom-up] 
policies have the advantage that they can be speciﬁcally developed for the local context in rela-
tion both to the local innovation structure but also in relation to the policy implementation 
framework” (p. 1228). Conceptually, this modality of design, in its ‘purest’ form, is also the 
most amenable to experimentation; a bespoke policy portfolio is generally ‘unproven’ in other 
contexts, allowing policy designers the most scope of ‘learning-by-doing.’ Along the same lines, 
bespoke policies can also generally be riskier as there is no history of their implementation and 
may be time- and resource-intensive as they take several iterations to become fully developed. 
 A closely related form of customization in policy design is the packaging of ‘off-the-shelf ’ or 
‘best-practice’ policies into mixes to address complex policy goals. In many cases, governments 
may opt to adapt best-practice programs or mechanisms based on their previous success in similar 
contexts and due to local capacity or time constraints. As  Howells (2005 ) furthers, these policies 
are often applied due to their tried-and-tested, proven merit, 
 because, in a sense, they are ‘off the shelf ’ they offer the potential to be much quicker 
to apply and therefore are more likely to ﬁnd an agency or other organization that has 
Policy Design and Non-Design
309
implemented the policy and has practical experience that can be used to provide sub-
sequent support and advice. 
 (p. 1228) 
 The drawbacks of off-the-shelf designs can emerge if they are signiﬁcantly incongruent with 
local contexts, capacities and resource endowments. 
 Bricolage as the Logic of Policy Design: The Idea of Patching 
 Unlike the rare cases of replacement, most design situations must deal with already created pol-
icies, are limited by historical legacies, and are thus hampered due to internal inconsistencies. 
Although other policy instrument groupings might be more successful in creating an internally 
supportive combination, it may be very difﬁcult to accomplish or propose wholesale change. 
Designs instead will often focus on reform and replacement of some aspect(s) of an existing 
arrangement rather than an extensive overhaul of existing policy structures. 
 A common process behind policy patching is ‘layering,’ in which some aspects of a policy are 
layered on top of pre-existing ones ( van der Heijden, 2011 ). As mentioned before, layering in 
policymaking can indicate an accretion process by which new policy components get combined 
with a prevailing policy framework. 
 This form of ongoing adjustment or bricolage forms the underlying logic of the processes of 
policy layering whereby knowledge about the interactions between internal policy components 
as well as the variability within the proceses of policy change are fundamental to creating the 
most effective mix of new and existing instruments (Howlett and Rayner, 2013) 
 A more problematic type of layering can ensue when the consequences of layering mix ele-
ments over the long-term leads to a process of ‘stretching’ or ‘tense layering’ ( Kay, 2007 ). That 
is, repeated bouts of layering can lead to both incoherence (‘tension’) amongst the goals and 
inconsistency with respect to the instruments and settings used in a policy area. Legacies from 
earlier rounds of decision-making will affect the introduction of new elements, which are very 
likely to conﬂict with pre-existing policy components. These tensions between the old and the 
new layers serve to drive policymaking forward so that even in more or less stable periods changes 
will continue to be made to policies in the effort to reconcile these tensions. 
 Tense-layering processes that prevail over several decades can lead to policy ‘stretching’ whereby 
policy components of a mix are spread over an prolonged period to address new policy priorities 
or sectors that they were not meant to cover at the outset (Feindt and Flynn, 2009). Unlike patch-
ing, stretching is more challenging as a design modality because the haphazard linking of existing 
policy elements to new goals signiﬁcantly enhances the risk of incoherence (Howlett and Rayner, 
2007). This is especially the case if the tools work at cross-purposes, resulting in incongruence 
between stated policy goals and an otherwise coherent policy mix (Kern and Howlett, 2009). 
 Each of the above indicates, three types of design modalities that are largely dictated by how 
the accumulation of anomalies is dealt with, on the one hand, and the intention of the govern-
ment for instrumental formulation, on the other. This intent, in turn, dictates the dominant 
‘direction’ of bricolage, based on whether iterations of bricolage move ‘forward’ towards major 
change with successful experimentation with policy components in order to correct anomalies, 
or loop ‘backward’ as policymakers work to retain the status quo ( Wilder and Howlett, 2014 ). 
 A ﬁnal, fourth type of formulation process is non-design. Here some policy decisions and 
formulation processes are highly contingent ones in which ‘design’ considerations may be more 
or less absent and where the logical or empirical relations between policy components are ignored 
(Kingdon, 1984;  Cohen et al., 1979 ;  Dryzek, 1983 ;  Eijlander, 2005 ;  Franchino and Hoyland, 
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2009 ;  Sager and Rielle, 2013 ). This includes a variety of contexts in which formulators, for 
example, may engage in trade-offs or log-rolling between different values or resource uses or, 
more extremely, engage in venal or corrupt behavior in which personal gain from a decision 
may trump other evaluative criteria. In these ‘non-design’ situations, the extent to which such 
considerations as political gain or blame avoidance calculations outweigh instrumental factors 
in policy formulation are empirical questions that can be studied systematically ( Hood, 2010 ). 
These four types of formulation processes ( Figure 20.1 ) vary in terms of the extent to which the 
policy goal is linked to individual and political interests rather than public ones. Most have been 
studied extensively in the political science literature but less systematically in the policy sciences 
( Saward, 1992 ;  Goodin, 1980 ;  Frye et al., 2012 ;  Gans-Morse et al., 2014 ). 
 Patching can also be problematic, as the addition of new goals or objectives always increases 
the risk of incoherence, as does the introduction of policy instruments that suppose new kinds 
of implementation preferences—for example, when a market orientation is introduced into an 
instrument set that has been based on a regulatory approach ( Howlett and Rayner, 2007 ). 
 Layering thus has two sides to it. On the one hand, negative stretching or destructive layering 
exacerbates tensions between regime elements and leads to wholesale change. However, layering 
can also have a positive side and help ameliorate or reduce tensions through patching. Moderate 
layering can be successfully accommodated through a process of learning and patching, leading 
to a policy mix that exhibits a high degree of coherence, consistency and congruence. Both 
these processes fall between the design and non-design ends of a spectrum of design processes 
that moves from highly intentional and instrumental replacement efforts to those that are more 
partial and less intentional such as ‘smart layering’ or patching and ultimately to those that involve 
sub-standard design such as ‘stretching’ and poor layering (see  Figure 20.2 ). 
 All of these design efforts can be done well or poorly, but all reﬂect some wholesale or partial 
effort to match policy goals and means in a sophisticated way linked to improving outcomes. 
Non-design types also vary in the same way but more by process of decision-making than 
by their sphere of activity. Non-design mechanisms, as highlighted above, include activities 
such as alternative generation by bargaining or log-rolling, corruption or co-optation, or other 
means that are not instrumental in the same sense as are design efforts. They can also deﬁne the 
 Figure 20.1 Formulation Spaces and Design Modalities 
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contextual barriers to design, however, by affecting design efforts to various degrees. Again, such 
efforts can also be done poorly or well (for example, maximizing the return from a bargain or 
the returns from corruption) depending on the context and situation and implicating different 
degrees of appraisal activities and competences or intentions on the part of governments. 
 Non-design activities can also be broken down in a similar fashion. They extend from those 
that are compatible with some aspects of design activities, such as bargaining among affected 
interests over elements of policy alternatives, to those such as pure electoral opportunism. The lat-
ter replace the logic of design intentionality with another calculus altogether. These non-design 
processes have been studied extensively in the political science literature but less systematically 
in the policy sciences ( Saward, 1992 ;  Goodin, 1980 ;  Frye et al., 2012 ;  Gans-Morse et al., 2014 ), 
despite their prevalence and importance in many areas. 
 Conclusion 
 ‘Policy design’ implies a knowledge-based process in which the choice of means or mechanisms 
through which policy goals are given effect follows a logical process of inference from known 
or learned relationships between means and outcomes. But not all policies are formulated in this 
way, and not all designs are successful. 
 Policy design includes both ‘good design’—in which means are selected in accordance with 
experience and knowledge—and ‘bad’ or poor design—in which principles and relationships are 
incorrectly or only partially articulated or understood. In some circumstances, however, policy 
decisions are more highly contingent and driven by situational logics, bargaining or opportunism 
and are not the result of careful deliberation and assessment. To distinguish these circumstances 
from poor design, these situations results can be thought of as ‘non-design.’ This chapter con-
siders the question of both design and non-design modes and formulates a spectrum of policy 
formulation types that helps clarify the nature of each type and the likelihood of each type of 
policy process unfolding. 
 Transforming policy ambitions into practice is a complex process, and intentionally creating 
the best possible arrangement of policy elements is not always the ﬁrst item on a government’s 
mind, nor necessarily within its reach. Many noble efforts of policymakers have failed due to 
poor design capacity or the inability or lack of desire to alter elements of existing policies in 
a more logical, instrumental fashion ( Cohn, 2004 ). These experiences have led to a greater 
 Figure 20.2 A Spectrum of Policy Design and Non-Design Types 
 Source: Modiﬁ ed from  Howlett and Mukherjee (2014 ). 
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awareness of the various obstacles to policy design efforts and have gradually fueled a desire to 
better understand the unique characteristics of policy formulation processes and the spaces and 
contexts in which design efforts are embedded. 
 As the discussion here has shown, both design and non-design formulation processes vary 
along several important dimensions. For design situations—that is, those characterized by a gov-
ernment desire to systematically match ends and means in the attainment of policy goals—the 
processes vary according to the nature of the resources available for design purposes and the con-
straints imposed by policy legacies. The former often determine the quality of the formulation 
effort and the design itself, while the latter generates contexts in which processes such as patch-
ing and stretching unfold. In a more non-design world, where the intention to instrumentally 
design is lacking, the processes vary in their distance from the design ideal of public service and 
improving the public good through better information and knowledge utilization and manage-
ment efforts ( Holmberg and Rothstein, 2012 ;  Rotberg, 2014 ); constraints on outcomes also exist. 
 The above discussion of different design modalities and processes does not preclude, but rather 
is built upon, the recognition and acceptance of the fact that some policy decisions and formu-
lation processes are highly contingent ones in which ‘design’ considerations may be more or less 
absent and where the logical or empirical relations between policy components are ignored. 
 Transforming policy ambitions into practice is a complex process. The efforts of policymakers 
have often failed due to poor designs that have inadequately incorporated this complexity in pol-
icy formulation (Stead and Meijers 2009;  Cohn, 2004 ). These experiences have led to a greater 
awareness of the various obstacles that can present themselves to policy design and have gradually 
fueled a desire for better understandings of the unique characteristics of policy formulation pro-
cesses and the spaces in which design efforts are embedded. 
 The new design orientation calls for a broadening of thinking about design beyond pol-
icy tool choices, examining combinations of substantive and procedural instruments and their 
interactions in complex policy mixes. It also has focused on a more detailed study of the actual 
formulation processes involved in tool and design choices as these occur and have evolved over 
time ( Linder and Peters, 1990 ;  Schneider and Ingram, 1997 ;  Considine, 2012 ). 
 Students of policy design must be aware of these differences and the situations governments 
are in or want to be in while developing policy options, making recommendations and providing 
advice to governments. More systematic study of these formulation contexts and processes can 
help move this area of policy design studies forward. 
 Note 
 1 . Layering, of course, is a concept developed in the neo-institutional sociological literature by some of its 
leading ﬁgures, namely  Beland (2007 ),  Thelen (2004 ),  Hacker (2004 ),  Beland and Hacker (2009 ) and 
Stead and Meijers (2004), to explain the pattern through which social and political institutions have 
evolved over long periods of time. 
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